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COMMENTS
RIGHTS OF WITNESSES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES
As a result of highly publicized congressional investigation during
the past year one of the most important, and certainly one of the most
controversial matters facing both the American public and the Con-
gressional Investigating Committee, is the question concerning the
rights of a witness when called before such an investigatory body. The
scope of this article is to attempt to reach an answer to this question,
and in so doing, two approaches will be used: 1) what are the boun-
daries or limits of the inquisitorial power of Congress? 2) what are the
legal rights of an individual when called upon to testify before an in-
vestigating committee?
The extreme importance in definitely ascertaining what are the rights
of a witness appear from the fact that, if the witness refuses to answer
the questions propounded to him by the committee on the ground that
the committee is either 1) exceeding its power or 2) violating the
legal rights of the witness, the good faith on the part of the witness in
refusing to answer is no defense' to the rather harsh penalties which
can be meted out for contumaciousness. 2 It can be seen, therefore, that
it behoves the witness to know precisely the extent of his rights and the
extent of the committee's authority to extract testimony from him.
I.
LIMITS OF THE COMMITTEE'S POWER
A witness may object to being questioned by a committee because:
a) the inquiry pertains to matters upon which Congress has no power
to legislate and since Congress can investigate in aid of legislative pur-
poses only, they could not lawfully authorize the investigation; b) the
delegation of power to the committee under the authorizing resolution
was ineffective because too vague to constitute a valid norm or limita-
tion, which is a requirement for a valid delegation of any legislative
power; c) the questions are beyond the scope of the inquiry as set forth
in the enabling resolution.
The first successful challenge to the validity of a resolution author-
izing a congressional hearing was upheld by the supreme court in Kil-
bourn v. Thompson.3 The court held that the resolution was improper
because it failed to state that legislation was contemplated on the sub-
ject to be investigated; and that the matter was one on which Congress
I U.S. v. Emspak, 95 F.Supp. 1012 (D.C., 1951) ; Sinclair v. U.S., 279 U.S. 263,
49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929).
2 2 U.S.C. 192.
3 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880).
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was not authorized to legislate. This view was later modified by the
court in the case of McGrain v. Daugherty4 wherein it held that where
the subject matter of the investigation is one upon which Congress can
properly legislate the resolution need not state that legislation is to be
forthcoming.
"Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be
had and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit . . . . The only legitimate
object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was
to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was such
that the presumption should be indulged in that this was the real
object. An express avowal of the object would have been better;
but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispen-
sible."5
Recent decisions have shown little evidence of an intent, on the part
of the courts, to depart from the above view and strictly limit the Con-
gressional power of investigation.
"If the subject matter under scrutiny may have any possible
relevancy and materiality, no matter how remote, to snare possi-
ble legislation, it is within the power of Congress to investigate
the matter. Moreover, the relevancy and materiality of the sub-
ject matter must be presumed."6
Witnesses have criticized resolutions as being too "vague" for them
to know the scope of the inquiry, and hence they are unable to judge
the pertinancy of the questions asked. This line of attack was used by a
defendant 7 cited for contempt of Congress.8 She attacked the resolu-
tion creating the House Un-American Activities Committee, authoriz-
ing investigations of "un-American actvities" as being in the nature of
a penal statute which does not have an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Claiming it violated substantive due process, she asserted its invalidity.
The court disposed of her contention by pointing out that her attack
was based on the rule of law that declared penal statutes invalid when
too vague, and that:
'This line of reasoning does not apply to statutes of other
types."9
If there is no penal sanction applied to the resolution it does not fall
under the condemnation of vagueness as do penal statutes. In its reason-
ing in the Byran case,10 the court pointed out that the exact scope of an
investigation cannot always be chartered and bounded in advance with
4 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927).
5 Supra, n.4. 273 U.S. 135 at pp.177,178.
6 U.S. v. Bryant, 72 F.Supp. 58, 61 (D.C., 1947).
7 Supra, n.6.
6 2 U.S.C. 192.
9 Supra, n.6, 72 F.Supp. 58, 63.
10 Supra, n.6.
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the precision of a survey. The resolution is not primarily a guidepost
for the witness but for the committee. Due to its conflicting duality of
purpose in that it must inform both the committee and the witness as
to the scope of the investigation, the resolution cannot possibly fully
satisfy both, when the committee demands vagueness and the witness
precision.
Dicta in the McGrain case 1 ' indicated that a witness may refuse to
answer where "the questions are not pertinent to the matter under in-
quiry."22 To secure a conviction for contempt of Congress" the burden
of proof is on the government to prove the pertinancy of the questions.
Whether a question is pertinent or not is a matter of law to be deter-
mined by the trial court in accord with the test laid down by the
supreme court in the leading case- of Sinclair v. United States;' if the
question is so related to the suibjects covered by the congressional reso-
lution that such facts reasonably could be said to be "pertinent to the
question under inquiry" the question as a matter of law is pertinent.
The gist of the offense of contempt of Congress is refusal to answer
pertinent questions; the witness's mistaken view of the law is no de-
fense.'5 The term "wilfully" in the statute16 does not require that a
criminal intent or a mens rea be proved." The statute requires only
that the refusal or failure to comply be intentional and not accidental
or through mistake of fact.'
It has been argued that a person who is directed to testify before a
committee is at a loss to determine whether the committee is acting
within the scope of its jurisdiction with regard to the scope of the ques-
tions asked. A person who declines to answer does so at his peril. How-
ever, there are many instances in which a person assumes a risk in de-
termining whether what he intends to do constitutes a crime. This is
true, for example, in respect to violations of the anti-trust laws, because
what constitutes an illegal restraint of trade is often a debateable matter.
As Mr. Justice Holmes aptly remarked:
".... the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends
on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently esti-
mates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not
only may he incur a fine or short imprisonment as here; he may
incure the penalty of death."' 9
11 Supra, n.4.
12 Sitpra, n.4, 273 U.S. 135, 176.
"Supra, n.8.
'USupra, n.1.
15 Ibid.
16 Supra, n.8.
17Barsky v. U.S., 167 F.2d 241 (C.A. D.C., 1948), cert. denied 334 U.S. 843.
is Fields v. U.S., 164 F.2d 97 (C.A. D.C., 1947).
19 Nash v. U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232 (1913).
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II.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE WITNESS IN RESPECT TO THE
QUESTIONS AsKED
If the investigating committee does not have the power to ask the
question, the witness has a corresponding right to refuse to answer.
Grounds that have been used to justify a witness's refusal to answer a
particular question are: 1) that the answer would incriminate him2"
2) that the answer would degrade him 21 3) that the answer would in-
vade his right of privacy.22
The privilege against self-incrimination was early recognized at
common law, 23 and today is found in the federal Constitution and in
the constitutions of all the states except two.24 The Fifth Amendment
of the federal Constitution reads:
S... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself..."
This privilege against self-incrimnation extends to witnesses before
legislative investigating committees. 25
However, in order to invoke the privilege it must be affirmatively
asserted by him.
28
"The privilege (of self-incrimination) may not be relied on
and must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought
to the attention of the tribunal which passes upon it."12 7
The question has not been settled as to what action on the part of the
witness constitutes a waiver.28
It has been held that if the legislature provides the witness with
complete immunity from prosecution by adequate legislation the wit-
ness then can not refuse to testify.29 However, the immunity granted
by statute in order to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination
must be a "real substitute." In order to be valid, the statutory immunity
conferred must be as broad as the constitutional privilege; a quid pro
qua, i.e., the witness must receive as much protection from the immunity
statute as the constitutional privilege affords him.
The immunity staute given to a witness at a congressional investiga-
tion reads:
20 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892).21 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644,40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).
22 Sinclair v. U.S., supra, n.l.
23 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2250 (3d ed., 1940).
24 Iowa and New Jersey. 8 WIG1M1ORE, EVIDENCE §2252 (3d ed., 1940).
25 Brown v. U.S., 276 U.S. 134, 48 S.Ct. 288, 72 L.Ed. 500 (1928) ; Wheeler v. U.S.,
226 U.S. 478, 33 S.Ct. 158, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913).
26 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2268 (3d ed., 1940).
27 U.S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 47 S.Ct.
302, 71 L.Ed. 560 (1927).
2 3Note, 35 Va. Law Rev. 104 (1949).29 Supra, n.21.
1952]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"No testimony given by a witness . . . shall be used as evi-
dence in any criminal proceeding against him in any event, ex-
cept in a prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testi-
mony. But an offered paper or record produced by him is not
within the said privilege."30
The full effectiveness of this statute has not been tested,a1 in fact,
doubt has been expressed that the immunity granted is sufficient to
supplant the privilege of not testifying on matter which would incrimi-
nate. An immunity statute with phraseology similar to the above has
been declared insufficient and the witness excused from testifying.
32
Even if the immunity statute is valid, it does not protect a witness from
being prosecuted by a different soveriegnty. 33 On this point, the Su-
preme Court has said:
"But, even granting that there was still a bare possibility that,
by his disclosure he might be subjected to the criminal laws of
some other soveriegnty, that is not a real and probable danger.73 4
Another ground used by witnesses in justifying their refusal to
answer the questions of the probing legislative committee, as indicated
supra, is that the answer to the question will render the witness infa-
mous, that it will degrade, disgrace and humilate him. There is no legal
basis for a refusal based on these grounds. The fact that the testimony
may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt
him from the duty of disclosure.3 5
A refusal to answer questions on the grounds that the question seeks
privileged matter, that which is private to the witness, is also without
legal merit, providing the question is as a matter of law pertinent to the
issue under inquiry. When the question is pertinent to the inquiry the
witness's private affairs become clothed with public interest and the
witness has a duty of disclosure."
III.
FUNDAMENTAL RIRHTS OF THE WITNESS IN RESPECT TO THE
COMMITTEE'S PROCEDURE
In approaching the problem of the rights of the witness and the
procedure of the congressional committee, it must be postulated that
there is no rational basis for applying the restrictions upon the proce-
30 28 U.S.C. 634.
sl Supra, n.28.
32 Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, n.20, held that an immunity statute "forbid-
ding the use of testimony" is not as broad as the privilege and is, therefore,
void because it would not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony which could be used in evidence against the witness in a criminal
proceeding.
33 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906).
4 Supra, n.21.
35 Ibid.; U.S. v. Thomas, 49 F.Supp. 537 (D.C. W.D. Ky., 1943) ; 2 U.S.C. 192.
36 Supra, n.4; Sinclair v. U.S., supra, n.1.
[Vol. 35
9OMMENTS
dure of the courts to the procedure of the congressional investigatory
committee merely because they have been insisted upon in judicial pro-
ceedings. 37 The courts have consistently held that the purpose of a
congressional investigating committee is merely to secure information
and in no way to exercise judicial power.39 These decisions have been
necessitated by the Constitution itself, and the doctrine of separation of
powers. The reason for the restrictions of judicial due process upon
court procedure is to protect a person when his rights are judicially de-
termined. Since the rights of a witness cannot constitutionally be de-
termined by a congressional committee, there is no need to protect him
with judicial due process.
Proponents of this theory contend that while the committees cannot
of themselves judge anyone, the hearings do have the effect of bringing
the witness before the bar of public opinion where he is thereby judged.
They claim that judicial due process is required because of such judg-
ment. The weakness of this position appears to be self evident. The
judgment arrived at is a popular judgment, and, of course, judicial due
process cannot be applied to popular judgment, as practically every act
in society results in popular judgment as to its propriety.
It should be pointed out here that if a court would hold that the con-
cept of judicial due process as evolved by our judicial system was to
apply to the procedure used by congressional investigating committees
because they were in effect sitting as courts, necessarily these results
would follow:
1) All congressional investigating committees would be unconsti-
tutional, because they would be arrogating to themselves judicial rights
insofar as they result in public judgment. All public committee hear-
ings today result in popular judgment of witnesses due to the publicity
by newspapers, radio and periodicals, not to mention the new medium
of television.
2) If congressional investigating committees could be constitu-
tionally considered to be "courts," appellate jurisdiction of the courts
over the power of Congress to punish witnesses for contempt would be
lost. The congressional committee being a court, its contempt citations
would not be reviewable in another court.40 It was for this reason that
the supreme court in Kilbourn v. Thompson4 deliberately adopted the
position that powers of congressional committees are not judicial in any
way.
Not only is there no basis for applying the restrictions on court pro-
cedure to congressional committee procedure, but also there is no sound
37Supra, n.4.
9 Ibid.
40 In re Falvey v. Kilborn, 7 Wis. 630 (1858); Fx parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38,
5 L.Ed. 391 (1822).
41 103 U.S. 168, 28 L.Ed. 377 (1880).
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reason for applying any other due process requirement. The require-
ments of due process apply only when life, liberty or property are
taken by government action.
A witness may feel that his reputation may suffer as a result of his
testifying before the committee, consequently that he was deprived of
something by the committee. However, even if this were true, this is
not the type of deprivation which is protected against by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. His reputation if it suffered, suffered
not as a direct result of the action of the committee but rather an indi-
rect consequence of the exercise of a lawful power.
".... that provision (Fifth Amendment) has always been
understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not
to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of a lawful
power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon,
or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individu-
als. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably
bring upon individuals great losses; may indeed render valuable
property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of con-
tracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could
not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be en-
acted, or a war be declared ?-43
However, even if it be assumed the witness may suffer a loss of
reputation by his testimony, and that this came about as a direct result
of the committee's action, such loss is not such a deprivation of any
fundamental right that is protected by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
While the life and liberty of which a person may not be deprived
without due process of law are not limited to freedom from mere phy-
sical harm or restraint, they do not extend any farther than the protec-
tion of those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness of freemen.44 At common law it was
not considered essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by freemen
that they should be free from public comment, or that their reputation
was included in the concept of liberty.45
However, again if it be assumed that loss of reputation is a loss of a
fundamental right, or should the committee in its action in some way
infringe a witness's fundamental rights, the problem then is, can such
an infringement ever be privileged?
In spite of the broad scope of the rights protected by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, these rights are not absolute but sub-
ject to the exercise of Congress's power to make regulations reasonably
necessary under the authority of its express powers.
42Supra, n.4.
43Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 455, 551, 26 L.Ed. 458 (1870).
44 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §574.
45 People ex rel. Stern v. Robert R. McBride & Co., 288 N.Y.S. 501, 506 (1936).
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Any fundamental right a citizen holds in society is subject to reason-
able government regulation which is in accord with due process.4" Gov-
ernment by definition presupposes the giving up of individual rights and
liberties for the welfare of the community.
If Congress itself took away any of a witness's fundamental rights
his objection could be that it violated legislati-(e due process, i.e. that
the law was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. 47
If the Committee infringed upon any of a witness's fundamental
rights his objection could be that its procedure violated due process.
However, due process in its procedural aspect does not necessarily im-
ply a regular proceeding in a court of justice, or after the manner of
such courts.4
In all cases that kind of procedure is due process of law which is
suitable and proper to the nature of the case and sanctioned by the
established customs and usages.49
The procedure which is sanctioned in congressional committees is
that which congress sets up.
"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings;...
The procedure which is suitable and proper in congressional com-
mittee hearings is that procedure which while enabling the committee
to carry out the purposes for which it was created, does not unreason-
ably, arbitrarily, or capriciously deprive a witness of his fundamental
rights. But within these limits all matters of methods are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or more just.-"
Where the procedure of a committee is sanctioned by the Senate,
either directly, or indirectly by allowing the committee to set up its own
procedure within limits, 52 is proper to carry out the purposes for which
the committee was created, and does not unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously infringe a witness's fundamental rights the witness cannot
object to the manner of conducting the hearing. For example, some
witnesses object to the publicity attendant upon these hearings, par-
ticularly when they are televised. Under the foregoing test, and assum-
ing that the publicity of the hearing violated some recognized funda-
mental right of the witness, his injury is damnum absque injuria for
the infringement was not unreasonable. While the primary purpose of
investigating committees is to gather facts for the legislators, a secon-
dary purpose is to focus public attention upon these facts so that en-
46Hadachek v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915).47 bid.
48 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102, 24 L.Ed. 616 (1879).
49Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S.Ct. 569,27 L.Ed. 552 (1883).
50 U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. 1 Sec.5 cl.2.
51 U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 12 S.Ct. 507, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1891).
52 60 Stat. 812.
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lightened public opinion will result in legislative action. As cited in
Tenny v. Brandhove,53
"It is the proper duty of a representative body to look dili-
gently into every affair of the government and to talk much
about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and
to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Con-
gress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the
acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the gov-
ernment, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being
served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift
them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in
embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which is
most important that it should understand and direct. The in-
forming function of Congress should be preferred even to its
legislative function."54
The supreme court has on more than one occasion impliedly recog-
nized that Congress does have a duty to inform the public.55
Senator Kefauver, who directed the crime probe which appeared in
a large part on television was of the opinion that this informing func-
tion was an essential attribute of Congress. In a senate debate on the
subject he remarked:
"It is an important by-product and a very important part of
an congressional investigation to let the people know what is go-
ing on, so they will take an interest in laws and the enactment of
legislation in that connection. I think we always have operated
on that basis, and it is a part of the function of congressional in-
vestigating committees."' 5
Applying this conclusion to television as a new method of com-
municating thought the Senator from Tennessee said:
"In addition, I think as many congressional hearings as pos-
sible should be televised. The remarkable thing about the interest
television stirred regarding the hearings of our crime investigat-
ing committee was that the public was interested in what our
committee was doing. There was no showmanship, no altering
of committee plans, no rearranging of schedules to benefit the
listening and viewing audience. We proceeded exactly as we
would have had there been no cameras. This, to my mind, means
that thirty million American people were interested in the actual
function of their government .... the better informed our peo-
ple become, the better governed they will be."' 57
A moments reflection will reveal the reasons for the ability of tele-
vision to capture the interest of listeners who would overlook a news-
53.. U.S .... 71 S.Ct. 783, 789 (1951).
54 WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT p.3 0 3 (15th ed. 1913).
35 Railroad Labor Board v. Robinson, 3 F.(2d) 488 (1925), reversed on othergrounds in 258 U.S. 619; Electric Bond Co. v. Security and Exchange Com-
mission, 303 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 678, 82 L.Ed. 936 (1938).
5697 Cong. Rec. 9995 (Aug. 10, 1951).
5 Ibid. at p. 9996.
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story on the same event. Courts of appellate jurisdiction have often
commented on the weaknesses of a "cold" record of a case up for re-
view. People are more interested in, pay better attention to, and are
more greatly moved by a live performance. Written words can at times
capture the interest and attention of readers, but to a much smaller de-
gree than a television program of the actual events.
As indicated, supra, due process requires that any law passed by
Congress must not unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously deprive
any citizen of his fundamental rights. The same test logically must be
applied to the means used in -arriving at the end they seek, which is
reasonable legislation, in the investigating committee. Therefore the
same test must be applied to its methods as is applied to the methods of
Congress, i.e. its procedure must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious as to the end which it seeks.
The end sought by investigating committees as indicated by their
enabling resolutions is to find facts. To find these facts, committees
employ the device of public hearings. In a democratic state, it is a basic
right of every citizen to attend public meetings. Another basic right is
the right of the public to every man's evidence.
Prior to the development of television, the rights of the citizenry to
attend public meetings was limited by the physical size of the hearing
chamber. In the pre-television era, no one would have questioned the
right of a committee to transfer its public hearing from a room seating
only one hundred persons to one seating one thousand, or even one
hundred thousand. Such a move would have even been lauded by the
public. Can objection be made when science by electronic methods has
enabled the committees to transfer their hearings from rooms seating,
perhaps, five hundred persons, to one seating many thousands? The ad-
vantages gained by such "electronic transfer" are obvious.
Even those who contend that televising these hearings violates pro-
cedural due process in that it infringes the witness's fundamental rights
in an unreasonable manner admit that the committee has the power to
hold public hearings, and that the amount of publicity attendant upon
such hearings is just a matter of degree. However, they feel that the
television publicity just goes too far. The answer to this "degree" argu-
ment can be gathered from the field of taxation.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall early in the history of our country made
his now famous statement that, "The power to tax is the power to de-
stroy."58 Notwithstanding the great power of taxation for evil, our
courts have yet to restrain a tax as being too large once it has been de-
termined that Congress has the power to levy the tax. They have con-
stantly iterated the principle that the amount of the tax is a political
58 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
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question. Similarly, it appears, the amount of the publicity of a con-
gressional hearing is a political question, and a witness who refuses to
testify on the grounds that there is too much publicity has no standing
in court. The remedy lies at the polls.
IV.
OTHER GOUNDS UPON WHICH THE WITNESS MAY REFUSE TO TESTIFY
In order to effectively insure the presence of witnesses called be-
fore a congressional investigating committee the courts have sustained
the power of Congress to issue subpoenas. 59 This power included the
right to require the production of papers, records, and documents by
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. 60 If the issuance, substance, or
form of the subpoena violates either the Fourth Amendment (searches
and siezures) or the Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination) the wit-
ness is justified in refusing to produce the documents.
A subpoena duces tecum does not violate the searches and siezures
clause of the Fourth Amendment if the documents called for are suf-
ficiently specified, and are sought for a purpose relevant to the inquiry.
The requirement of "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation"' 1
necessary in the issuance of a subpoena is satisfied in the case of a con-
gressional investigating committee's subpoena if: a) the investigation
is authorized by Congress; b) is for a purpose Congress can order; c)
the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry. Beyond this the re-
quirement of reasonableness comes down to the specification of the
documents to be produced for the purposes of the relevant inquiry.62
Mr. Justice Sutherland in Brown v. United States63 laid down the test of
a valid subpoena duces tecum stating that it does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if it specifies a reasonable period of time, and, with reason-
able particularity, the subjects to which the documents called for re-
late. He went on to point out that a subpoena duces tecum may never-
theless be so onerous as to constitute an unreasonable search; however
to uphold an objection to a subpoena duces tecum on the ground of
unreasonable search, the search involved must be out of proportion to
the ends sought, as when the person served is required to fetch all his
books at once to an exploratory investigation whose purposes and
limitations can be determined only as it proceeds. 64 Hence, an order
for the production of books and papers which limits the examination
59 Supra, n.4.
60 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, Wage & Hour Administrator,
327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1945).
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Supra, n.25.
64 47 Am. JuR. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES §58; McMann v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir., 1937), cert. denied in 301 U.S. 684. As to
"fishing expeditions" refer to 17 AM. JUR. DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION §11.
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to such matter as is pertinent to the issue does not infringe on the con-
stitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The privilege against self-incrimination, as discussed supra,6 5 that
justifies refusal to orally testify to matters that would incriminate the
witness is equally applicable as an aid to the witness when a subpoena
duces tecum requires that the witness produce certain records and docu-
ments incriminatory in nature. The compulsory production of a man's
private books or papers to be used against him is not substantially dif-
ferent than compelling him to be a witness against himself. Such seizure
or compulsory production is within the spirit of the constitutional pro-
visions providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against
himself.66 The privilege does not extend, however, to public records or
to books or records that are required by law to be kept, such as the
records of a corporation,6 7 an insolvent bank,68 drug prescriptions, 9
druggists' records of sales of intoxicating liquors,70 and records of
pawnbrokers. 71
It should be remembered, however, that a witness may not claim the
privilege without ample justification. The claiming of the privilege does
not relieve the witness from the duty to bring the documents to the in-
vestigation, but it does prevent the committee, acting as a whole, to uti-
lize the documents or papers. As stated by Justice Sutherland,72
"A person required by a subpoena duces tecum to produce
papers and documents has a duty to produce the papers in order
that the court might by an inspection of them satisfy itself
whether they contain matters which might tend to incriminate.
If he declined to do so, that alone would constitute a failure to
show reasonable ground for his refusal to comply with the re-
quirements of the subpoena ... the individual citizen may not
resolve himself into a court and himself determine and assert the
criminating nature of the contents of books and papers required
to be produced."
If the witness refused to show the documents to the head of the
investigating committee on the grounds that the documents would tend
to incriminate him and a court later determined that, as a matter of law,
they were not of such a nature as to justify invoking the privilege, then
it seems to the writers that a contempt charge against the witness
brought by the committee would be sustained; the witness acts at his
peril and a mistake of law is no defense.
65 47 Am. JuR. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES §58.
6 Boyd v. U.S. 116 U.S. 616,6 S.Ct. 524,29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
67 Supra, n.60.
68 Burnett v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 639, 129 P. 1110 (1913).
69 17 Am. JuR. DRUGS AND DRUGGISTS §14.
70 30 Am. JuR. INTOXICATING LIQUORS §433.
7140 AM. JUR. PAWNBROKERS AND MONEYLENDERS §6.
72 Supra, n.25.
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The televising of the Kefauver committee proceedings has raised
several new questions. What is the extent of a witness' right of pri-
vacy, and does the televising of a hearing constitute a violation of this
right of privacy? The concept that each and every individual has an
inherent right of privacy is the result of an 1890 law review article by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis." This right of privacy in
the sense used by these authors was never recognized at common law.
The constitutional right to be let alone refers only to the right to be
free from bodily injury, or from a reasonable fear of bodily injury, and
does not include a right to be free from public comment. 4 Nor is it in-
cluded in the Federal Constitution, the Amendments, or Congressional
enactment.
7 5
Since the publication of the law review article referred to above,
many states have enacted legislation granting to the individual a right
of privacy. But, even in these states, this right can be waived, either
voluntarily or involuntarily. If the witness by his accomplishments,
fame, mode of life or by his adopting a profession or calling which
gives the public a legitimate interest in his activities and character, he
is a public personage and he thereby relinquishes or loses his right of
privacy.7 16 The publication of a person's name or picture in connection
with a news or historical event of legitimate public interest does not
constitute an actionable invasion of the right of privacy.7 7 Also, in cer-
tain public matters such as jury duty, public hearings and the like, the
right of the public to the performance by all citizens of the public ob-
ligation has been held to be paramount to the individual's right of pri-
vacy.7 8
A witness can not refuse to appear before a congressional investi-
gating committee hearing on the grounds that he must travel too far or
incur too great an expense in so doing. The committee's power to com-
pel attendance of the citizens is absolute.
"Either House of Congress in the discharge of the great
duties devolved upon it by the Constitution and as necessarily
incident thereto, has the undoubted right to require the personal
attendance before its committees, as a witness or otherwise, of
any citizen of the country, and to be paid or not according to its
own will and pleasure. Attendance in such a case is not by agree-
ment, but is the voluntary or involuntary submission of a subject
7 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L.Rev. 193 (1890).
74People ex rel. Stern v. Robert R. McBride & Co., supra, n. 45; Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909).
75Prudential Insurance Co v. Check, 259 U.S. 530, 42 S.Ct. 516, 66 L.Ed. 1044
(1922).
76 76 ALR 58.
77 138 ALR 78.
78 138 ALR 31.
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to a power of government which must be obeyed and which can-
not be resisted. 79
GAYLORD L. HENRY
FINTAN M. FLANAGAN
IRVING W. ZIRBEL
79Lilly's Case, 14 Ct.Cl. 539, 542 (1878).
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